Keynote Speakers

Is Science Epistemically Responsible? The Prospects of the Debate

Abstract: According to instrumentalists and constructive empiricists, science should be technologically fruitful, but it need not be also epistemically responsible. That is, it cannot prove that its theories are true (as opposed to simply empirically adequate), hence it cannot be required to provide knowledge, i.e., true and justified descriptions of the unobservable levels of reality. Scientific realists, instead, hold science can achieve both truth and justification, hence it has the paramount responsibility of delivering theoretical knowledge. To make their point, realists must propose exceptionless criteria of truth, but none seems to work across the board. They have also tried different "recipes", i.e., versions of realism, like entities realism, structural realism, deployment realism, or semi-realism. Yet, up to now none of these has been completely immune to the antirealist's objections, especially those concerning the empirical underdetermination of theories and the pessimistic meta-induction from the history of scientific failures. Realists have reacted by refining their initial criteria and proposing new "recipes", but counterexamples have been brought to each of them. While nothing forbids realists to try still new versions and refinements, certain critics contend that the debate itself is unending and unconclusive. Thus, they take deflationist approaches, like Fine's "natural ontological attitude", Faye's radical naturalism, Stanford's moderate particularism, Saatsi' "exemplar realism", stance voluntarism, etc. On the contrary, I point out that these deflationist positions are unsatisfactory, while the realism-antirealism debate has displayed some progress, achieving substantial clarification in certain areas. Not only there has been some convergence of originally distant positions both among realists and among antirealists, but even the two opposite camps have come closer to each other on certain important issues. In particular, I would argue that the most discussed realist criterion of truth (the "no miracle" argument based on novel predictions) has been refined to a formulation which stands unchallenged, and a moderate version of deployment realism has emerged, which may well prove unobjectionable.

Bio: Mario Alai (1952), a Philosophy graduate of the University of Bologna, holds postgraduate degrees from the Universities of Urbino and Helsinki, and doctoral degrees from the Universities of Maryland and of Florence. After teaching Religion, Psychology, Education, History and Philosophy in high schools in Cesena and in Turin (Italy), from 1999 to his retirement in 2022 he worked at the University of Urbino first as lecturer, then as researcher in Logics and Philosophy of Science, and finally as associate professor of Theoretical Philosophy and of Philosophy of Language. His main research interests concern metaphysical realism and scientific realism. In particular, he has defended sophisticated metaphysical realism against such versions of antirealism as neopositivistic and Dummettian verificationism, Parrini's agnosticism, Goodman's constructionism, and Putnam's "internal" realism. Besides, he has been arguing for a balanced form of selective scientific realism by discussing the "no miracle argument", the nature and role of "novel predictions", and the best ways to resist the pessimistic meta-induction and to overcome the empirical underdetermination of theories. He has written also on the philosophy of Agazzi, Carnap, Frege, D. Lewis, Popper, Quine, Russell, Wittgenstein, and published works on the history of philosophy of science, the history of philosophy of language, the theory truth, the theory of knowledge and justification, skepticism, artificial intelligence in scientific discovery, meaning and reference, and experimental philosophy.

Responsibility of a Scientist Through the Lens of Political Philosophy of Science

Abstract: The aim of my presentation is to explore the problem of the scientist's responsibility from the perspective of the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science had a special mission in the period of the coronavirus pandemic, when seemingly purely medical and biological problems were elevated to the level of the most complex social problems of organization and financing of health care. Why is the political responsibility of science particularly relevant in connection with the phenomenon of "post-normal" science, as well as with the problem of realizing the political subjectivity of science and its potential "democratization"? Is the main reason relates to the nature and epistemological status of "post-normal" science and the possible role of scientists in political decision-making in situations of significant uncertainty of the future (which is particularly characteristic of ecology)? Firstly, we are inclined to stress the crucial importance of appealing to traditional criteria of rationality, the carrier and conductor of which are scientists for they are working according to the norms and guidelines of "normal" science. Secondly, we argue that, despite the transdisciplinary nature of the problems at the heart of post-normal science, the political subjectivity of modern science is not full-fledged because of the alienation of scientists from important political decisions. Thirdly, science does not participate in politics in an independent way, as an autonomous actor acting on the same plane and on a par with other political actors (like parties or other political communities). Whether science and scientists acquire or lose the status of a political subject depends on the nature of the political milieu in society. Political subjectivity in a certain political climate cannot be the goal, the value of science, and the meaning of the scientist's activity. Striving for political subjectivity as a norm of existence of "post-normal" science could lead to a radical change in the "self-consciousness" of science, its sociocultural status and political weight, which would certainly affect the position of scientists. However, this aspiration makes theoretical and practical sense only as an integral part of the progressive movement towards civil society and democracy.

Bio: Dr., Prof. Valentin A. Bazhanov (born in 1953 in Kazan, Russia, the USSR) received his Kandidature (PhD) from Leningrad (now St.-Petersburg) University. He has been on the faculty of Philosophy at Kazan University since 1979 until 1993. He has been the Senior Research member at the Institute of Philosophy (Moscow) in 1987-88. Since 1993 he is at Ulyanovsk branch of Moscow State University (now Ulyanovsk State University). The Dean of the Humanities (1993 - October, 1995), Key researcher at Baltic Federal University (Kantian Rationality Lab, 2020 - 2022). He won Academy of Sciences of the USSR prize for young researchers (1985) and Kazan University First prize (1989). He is the International Science Foundation winner (1994), British Academy Fellow (1998) and Lakatos Research Fellowship (2007-2008). Dr. Prof. Bazhanov was an Associate Editor of THE REVIEW OF MODERN LOGIC (former MODERN LOGIC) since 1989 to 2004, an Associate Editor of PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (RAS), EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (RAS), PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (RAS), KANT STUDIES (Baltic Federal University), and LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS (RAS). He has published 15 books and edited 6 books (included scientific biographies of great geometer N.I. Lobachevsky and forerunner of non-classical logic N.A. Vasiliev). In addition, he has 625 papers to his credit.

Why Do We ‘Must’ and ‘Should’? Bridging the Gap from ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’

Abstract: The split and gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ between ‘fact’ and ‘value’ or ‘norm,’ as proposed by Hume, Moore and others, are fictional for two reasons. First, there are no purely objective facts, because facts always involve subjective intervention by cognitive subjects. Second, there are no purely subjective norms, because norms must have objective foundations and theoretical bases. Why do we ‘must’ and ‘should?’ This is determined by a combination of the following factors: First, our needs, intentions, and goals – where intentions and goals originate from needs, and the strength of our intentions often depends on the strength of needs. However, needs themselves have objective grounds. Second, the current state of affairs often deviates significantly from our needs and intentions. We therefore strive to change the status quo and create a vision that aligns with our needs and intentions. Third, we rely on relevant broad scientific principles – including those of natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities – as well as on social consensus, such as cultural traditions and conventions. Fourth, we depend on our rational thinking ability: faced with the current situation, and drawing upon relevant theories and social consensus, we rationally deliberate on what we must or should do – how we can satisfy our need, achieve our goals, and turn our visions into reality. Thus, there exists a common thread linking our needs, interests, intentions, goals, the distant reality, and our rational capacity. This commonality bridges the gap between ‘facts’ on the one side and ‘values’ and ‘norms’ on the other.

Bio: Chen Bo is Chair Professor of Humanities and Social Science, Doctoral Supervisor at School of Philosophy, Wuhan University. He has been elected as Titular Member of IIP (Institut International de Philosophie, Paris, 2018) and of AIPS (Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, Bruxelles, 2021). He was a full Professor for 23 years at the Department of Philosophy, Peking University (1999-2021). His specialty and expertise cover logic and analytic philosophy, especially the philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, history of logic, epistemology, Hume, Frege, Russell, Quine, and Kripke. He is also engaged in comparative study of Chinese and Western philosophy. His representative publications include the monographs Dialogues, Interaction, and Participation: The Process of Integrating into the International Philosophical Community (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2020), Analytic Philosophy: Criticism and Construction (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2018), Studies on Paradoxes (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2014; second edition, 2017), Studies in Philosophy of Logic (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2013), and Studies on Philosophy of Logic (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2004; revised and enlarged edition,18 Social Sciences in China 2013), Studies on Quine’s Philosophy: From Logical and Linguistic Points of View (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1998); and the papers “Logical Exceptionalism: Development and Predicaments” (Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, vol. 90, 2024, no. 3) and “Social Constructivism of Language and Meaning” (Social Sciences in China [Chinese Edition], 2014, no. 10). E-mail: chen-bo@whu.edu.cn.

Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: From Pure Science to World-changing Technology

Abstract: For the first two decades after World War II, physicists had little appreciation for work on the foundations and philosophy of quantum mechanics. This began to change in the 1960s with the publication of Bell's work, and that shift accelerated in the 1980s with experimental tests that confirmed quantum predictions that contradicted Bell's inequalities. In the 1990s, these developments merged with fundamental experimental research, giving rise to such fields as quantum information and quantum computing. As these fields gained technical relevance and attracted significant funding, fundamental quantum research turned into a prestigious discipline with clear potential for societal impact. This growing prestige and potential impact raise a question: does the development of the field bring more responsibility? In the early stages of research, the social impact seemed minimal, but the landscape has changed - especially with the combination of quantum technology and AI. At the same time, there remains considerable uncertainty about both the promises and potential risks of these developments. So, the argument against responsibility based on ignorance, alongside the argument based on fragmentation of responsibility, should certainly be taken seriously. Yet some potential dangers seem too serious to be ignored. In the talk, we will explore the changing responsibility of scientists in fundamental quantum research, drawing comparisons with other historical cases where scientific advances have posed ethical challenges.

Bio: Dennis Dieks is a professor (em.) of philosophy and foundations of the natural sciences, particularly physics, at Utrecht University. He is one of the discoverers of the no-cloning theorem (1982) and has published extensively on the foundations and interpretation of quantum mechanics, the concept of 'identical particles,' and the philosophy of space and time. He is a member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Royal Holland Society of Sciences and Humanities, and the Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences. In 2024, he won the Langerhuizen Oeuvre Prize.

Analysis of Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence as a Science of Design

Abstract: The responsibility of AI can be first approached as a science of design, analyzing it in terms of the objectives sought, the processes selected, and the expected results, from which consequences can be derived. This responsibility can be that of individual or social subjects. The former are researchers, especially when they choose ends and means in their activity to expand human possibilities via AI; and the latter are organizations when they prioritize objectives, by supporting processes and by highlighting certain results. A key factor for individual and social responsibility in AI is the chosen rationality. Herbert Simon distinguished three types of rationality: (i) administrative, (ii) human in general (based on economic decision-making) and (iii) symbolic. It is in this third type, which Simon associated with AI, where what Thomas Nickles calls "alien reasoning" appears, a type of rationality different from human rationality and which we do not control, which raises questions about responsibility for research processes. In recent years in particular, a group of leading researchers, including Geoffrey Hinton and Daniel Kahneman, have drawn attention to the possible extreme risks of achieving "artificial general intelligence." This in turn raises the question of whether or not to accept a "digital mind" and, if so, how to understand it, which raises the question of responsibility in the context of the limits of science.

Bio: Wenceslao J. Gonzalez is Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science (University of A Coruña). He has been a Team Leader of the European Science Foundation program entitled "The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective" (2008-2013). He received the Research Award in Humanities given in 1995 by the Autonomous Community of Galicia (Spain). In 2009 he was named a Distinguished Researcher by the Main National University of San Marcos in Lima (Peru). He was a member of the National Committee for Evaluation of the Scientific Activity (CNEAI) of Spain. Dr. Gonzalez has been a member of the National Commission for the Evaluation of Research Activity (CNEAI). He has been the Director of the Research Center for Philosophy of Science and Technology (CIFCYT) at the University of A Coruña since its creation in 2017. He is also the President of the Philosophy of Science and Technology Foundation (FFCYT), recognized by the Xunta de Galicia as of educational interest (Diario Oficial de Galicia of June 18, 2015) and of Galician interest (Diario Oficial de Galicia of July 7, 2015). He has been Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Humanities. He was President of the Committee of Doctoral Programs at the University of A Coruña (2002-2004). He was the promoter of the Honorary Doctorate awarded by the UDC to John Worrall (London School of Economics) on March 11, 2020.

University Education in the Age of AI

Abstract: In the era of artificial intelligence, people have clearly recognized the following facts: (1) The nature of human beings is undergoing change; (2) Appropriate algorithms can process knowledge, discover, reorganize, and present relations between pieces of knowledge with extraordinary efficiency. As a result, education must inevitably undergo corresponding changes. All previous educational reforms are merely updates compared to the revolution we currently face, while today's educational revolution requires a complete redesign of the system. It must redefine the nature, function, and content of education from scratch and establish new institutions. As for research universities, standard, foundational, and general education courses will all be delivered using artificial intelligence methods and will be studied independently by students. In other words, a large amount of foundational, repetitive, and standard-answer-oriented instruction and experimentation will be handed over to AI systems. Teachers will be responsible for exploratory and research-oriented advanced courses; in other words, courses in which teachers are directly involved will be equivalent to small, temporary academic research teams, and face-to-face teaching between teachers and students will become a process of collaborative research. At the same time, courses that develop and strengthen uniquely human abilities—such as willpower and emotional intelligence, integrative ability, and teamwork—will become the most important aspect of university education.

Bio: Shuifa Han is Boya Distinguished Professor at Peking University, Director of the Academic Committee of the Department of Philosophy at Peking University, and Director of the Institute of Foreign Philosophy at Peking University. He is also Deputy Director of the Chinese Society for the History of Foreign Philosophy. His main research fields include Kant's philosophy, political philosophy, Max Weber, modern Chinese thoughts, and Hanese philosophy. His major works include A Research on Kant's Theory of "Thing-in-itself" (1990), Max Weber (1998), University and Learning (2008), The Horizon of Justice (2009), Critical Metaphysics (2009); he is also translator of Critique of Practical Reason (Kant), The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Weber). His main papers include "The Concept of Bürger in Kant's Philosophy of Law", "The Third Meaning of Enlightenment: Enlightenment Thought in the Critique of Judgment", "Humanism in the Age of AI", "Hanese Philosophy: Methodological Significance", "Hanese Thought Orders and the Ancient Divine System".

Approaches to Explainable and Ethical AI

Abstract: This presentation explores the development of explainable and ethical artificial intelligence (AI). It begins by examining the nature of AI and its primary implementation paradigms—symbolic reasoning and model-based learning—highlighting the distinct ethical and safety challenges that arise from each. These challenges differ between non-embodied AI systems (such as issues of reliability, bias, and transparency in large language models) and embodied AI systems (such as accountability and moral dilemmas in autonomous vehicles). To address these issues, the presentation proposes four key technical pillars for building trustworthy AI: establishing a world model for factual grounding, ensuring logical correctness through formal methods, achieving verifiability and explainability via integrated approaches, and embedding ethical and legal norms with causal traceability. Finally, the “3C” principles—Correctness, Clarity, and Compliance—are introduced as a guiding framework for translating theory into practice in the creation of responsible and trustworthy AI systems.

Bio: Beishui Liao is a Full Professor of Logic and Computer Science at Zhejiang University, where he has held the prestigious Qiushi Distinguished Professorship and Changjiang Distinguished Professorship since 2019. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from Zhejiang University in 2006 and has since established himself as a leading scholar in logic, formal argumentation, and their applications to multi-agent systems, explainable AI, and ethical AI. Currently, he leads a major project funded by the National Social Science Fund of China on Logics for New Generation Artificial Intelligence. He serves as Vice Dean of the Faculty of Humanities at Zhejiang University, Director of the Institute of Logic and Cognition, and Co-Director of the Zhejiang University–University of Luxembourg Joint Lab on Advanced Intelligent Systems and Reasoning (ZLAIRE). He has been a Guest Professor at the University of Luxembourg since 2014 and has held visiting positions at the University of Texas at Austin, the University of Brescia, the University of Oxford, and the University of Cambridge. An active member of the international academic community, he serves as an Associate Editor of Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, AI Logic Corner Editor of the Journal of Logic and Computation, and an editorial board member of Argument & Computation and Journal of Applied Logics. He is also a steering committee member of DEON and COMMA. In 2015, he co-founded the International Conference on Logic and Argumentation (CLAR), which has since become a leading international conference in the field of logic and argumentation. He has published three monographs and numerous papers in top journals and conferences, including Social Sciences in China, Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Journal of Logic and Computation (JLC), IJCAI, and KR, among others.

What Do the Fundamental Differences Between Natural Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence Mean to the Future of Art (As an Example)?

Abstract: Animals and humans mainly perceive and change their environment in the form of natural intelligence. Before the advent of AI, although with plenty of machines, the intelligence that uses and controls them was still human intelligence. From now on, this traditional mode of life may change drastically. With the massive introduction of AI, what challenges will humans encounter in their interaction with their environment in the future? Recognizing the difference between the principles and mechanisms of natural vs artificial intelligence will help us recognize such challenges and their severity. This paper uses art creation and application as an example to analyze and explain the fundamental differences between the Bayesian brain (natural intelligence) and the Boltzmann machine (artificial intelligence). The differences of natural kinds and statistical kinds foreshadow a big possible difference between creative processes and their products.

Bio: Chuang Liu is a Distinguished Professor in the School of Philosophy at Fudan University, Shanghai; Chair of the department of philosophy of science and logic, the Director of the Center for the Philosophy and Science of Intelligence (Fudan PSI), and the Academic Director of the Institute of Philosophy, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CASIP). Chuang Liu is professor emeritus in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Florida. His research interests span in philosophy of physics, scientific methodology, and philosophy of intelligence and has published widely among the top journals in philosophy of science. His recent work engages evolutionary game-theoretic approaches to morality, Markov blankets and active inference in perception and cognition, and the role of teleology in scientific explanation—connecting norms, modeling, and cognition across species.

A Philosophical Case against Human Heritable Genome/Polygenic Editing

Abstract: The responsibility of science and technology means that scientific and technological professionals have to be in a state of being responsible, answerable, or accountable for something within their power, and being prepared to stand up on behalf of their stakeholders and act and speak for them. By the time of the illegal human embryo genome editing conducted by He Jiankui a number of participants including He himself in the debate on human germline genome editing did not realize that the future generation should be one important member as the whole among stakeholders. Neither Julian Savulescu and his colleagues pay attention to the responsibility for the future generation when they argue for human heritable polygenic editing (HHPE) as the next frontier of genomic medicine. In this presentation, I will first argue that our generation has the obligation for the future generation, and it means that the future generation should be one of the stakeholders in human heritable genome editing (HHGE) and HHPE. Then I will argue that in practice HHGE and HHPE are both scientifically untestable. Now the life expectancy in China is 79 years old, we have to watch Lulu, Nana and Amy whose genomes were edited by He Jiankui for 79 years to know whether they would be infected with HIV or not, even they would not be for whole life, the fact cannot prove that it is due to HHGE that He conducted. The same is with HHPE: the fact that a person who undergoes HHPE does not suffered with cancer in his 79 years old life in China cannot prove the success of HHPE. The testing has been done after He’s embryo editing shows that in Lulu’s and Nana’s genomes there are a number of off-targets, editing errors and mosaicisms which would have negative health impacts to the future generation, as well as many other unknowns. How the medical scientists who conduct HHGE/HHPE could perform the responsibility (including answerability and accountability) for the future generation after the hundred years of their death? So the conclusion is: Both HHGE and HHPE are unjustifiable scientifically and ethically.

Bio:Professor Emeritus, Institute of Philosophy and Honorary Director, Centre for Applied Ethics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Professor, Center for Ethics and Moral Studies, and Director, Institute of Bioethics, Renmin University of China; Professor and Honorary Director, Center for Bioethics, School of Medicine, Xiamen University; Member of the Advisory Committee, Advanced Institute of the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China; Honorary President, Chinese Society for Bioethics; Member, Assessment Panel, Public Policy Research Funding Scheme, Hong Kong; Lifetime Member, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University; Fellow, The Hastings Center; Member, International Institute of Philosophy. Major past posts: Vice-President, Ethics Committee, Ministry of Health, China; Vice-President, Chinese Society for Philosophy of Nature, Science and Philosophy; President, Chinese Society for Philosophy of Science; President, Chinese Society for Bioethics; Chair, Chinese Committee, China-UK Summer School of Philosophy; Member, Committee on Ethical, Legal and Social Implications, International HapMap Consortium; Member, Gender Advisory Panel, UNDP/UNFPA/WHO/Work Bank Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction; Member, UNESCO International Bioethics Committee; Member, UNAIDS Reference Group on AIDS and Human Rights; Assessor, Executive Committee, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science/International Association of History and Philosophy of Science; Member, Board of Directors, International Association of Bioethics; President, Asian Bioethics Association. Laureate of award or prize: 2002 World Network of Technology Awards Ethics; 2009 UNESCO Avicenna Prize of Ethics of Science; 2011 Henry Knowles Beecher Bioethics Award; 2017 Chinese Academy of Social Science Excellent Policy Recommendation; 2020 Chinese Society for Philosophy of Nature, Science and Philosophy Lifetime Achievement Award; 2022 Ministry of Education Policy Study Award co-winner with Professor Lei Ruipeng. Publications：25 books including Realism vs Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Science (co-editor, in English), Bioethics, Reproductive Health and Ethics (3 volumes), Patient’s Rights (co-author), AIDS, Sex and Rights, Biomedical Research Ethics (co-author), Bioethics: Asian Perspectives (in English), Introduction to Bioethics (co-author) , Public Health Ethics (co-author)，An Introduction to Political Philosophy (co-editor), Contemporary Studies in Bioethics (co-editor, 2 volumes) and near 450 articles published in China or in other countries, among which 92 articles are in English.